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ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1;
Mr. Colleli contends that Ms. Colleli failed to marshal the evidence. See Appellee *s
Brief at 12 ("there is not one speck of evidence . . . that supports the District Court's
findings"). Mr. Colleli is partly wrong and partly correct. First, he is clearly wrong to
assert that Ms. Colleli failed to marshal the evidence. Ms. Colleli has extensively
presented the procedural facts of the case, since those particular facts are the predicates in
determining the reasonableness of attorney fees and the facts on which the trial court
based its ruling. The "evidence," in the context of determining the reasonableness of
attorney fees, is the nature of the case and the manner in which it was prosecuted.
Ms. Colleli enumerated in substantial detail the procedural steps that were involved.
Mr. Colleli, however, is right to suggest that there is not a speck of evidence to
support the trial court's findings. That is because there is a dearth of evidence to support
the trial court's findings. In effect, the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. The
only "fact" relied on by the trial court was the deposition of Mr. Colleli. But Ms. Colleli
shows that the trial court erroneously adopted an extracted version of the deposition
rather than a complete and true copy of it. Moreover, even when the trial court was
shown that it was mistaken, the trial court failed to acknowledge its error. Instead, the
trial court insisted that it had a true and complete copy of the deposition. The record,
however, clearly demonstrates the trial court's erroneous belief.
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Ms. Colleli also examined in detail the trial court's findings with respect to when the
issue of transportation was resolved and the actual chronology of how and when
Mr. Colleli finally agreed to provide transportation. This examination reveals that the
trial court's findings are materially inconsistent with each other. See Appellant's Brief
at 25-27'. Accordingly, such inconsistencies make the trial court's findings wholly
unreliable. Mr. Colleli completely ignores these inconsistencies.
Mr. Colleli engages in repeated obfuscation by continually characterizing the primary
dispute as one of visitation. For example, Paragraph 8 of Mr. Colleli's Statement of the
Case states the following:
"Mr. Colleli agreed to appropriate visitation and the reduction of child
support. (R. 23)"
First, the citation to "R. 23" does not support Mr. Colleli's statement. Second,
"transportation" was always the key issue.
Another example of Mr. Colleli's misrepresentation of the facts is his statement made
without any citation to the record:
"Far from being intransigent, Mr. Colleli readily agreed to Ms. Colleli's
requests. Not only is Mr. Colleli's cooperation unmentioned in
Ms. Colleli's Brief, Ms. Colleli actually argues that Mr. Colleli was
intransigent." Appellee's Brief at 13.
The facts clearly refute the assertion that Mr. Colleli was cooperative. Until the day
of trial, Mr. Colleli insisted that Ms. Colleli provide the transportation. This fact was
clearly acknowledged and articulated by the trial court. (R. at 620/Trial Br. at 45-46, 56).
Moreover, Mr. Colleli filed a Rule 60(b) motion to have removed from the temporary
-2-

order his obligation to provide transportation. (R. at 124). At mediation, Mr. Colleli
again insisted that Ms. Colleli provide transportation. (R. at 115). And finally, in
Mr. Colleli's own handwriting, he again insisted that Ms. Colleli provide transportation
when he filed his "Proposed Settlement" in support of his Certificate of Readiness for
Trial. (R. at 203-09). These facts clearly show that Mr. Colleli was intransigent on the
issue of transportation.
While the ultimate objective was to achieve statutory visitation for the minor
children, "visitation" was and is impossible without transportation. Even the trial court
admitted that the issue of transportation remained unresolved until the date of trial.
(R. at 620/Trial Br. at 45-46, 56). Mr. Colleli fails to acknowledge this fact. Any
agreement on visitation was completely hollow if not accompanied with an agreement to
provide transportation.
Issues No, 2, 3 and 4:
Mr. Colleli contends that this Court has no jurisdiction over the remaining three
issues presented because those issues should have been appealed when the orders giving
rise to those issues were entered. This contention raises the issue of whether these
particular orders were at the time of their entry "final" for the purposes of appeal.
Divorce proceedings are somewhat unique in that the trial court has continuing
jurisdiction. Divorce matters come before the trial court upon filing petitions or motions.
During any series of proceedings, new motions are often filed, ruled upon and orders
issued. Mr. Colleli urges this Court to deem all interim orders entered as being final
-3-

orders for purposes of appeal. Ms. Colleli urges a more practical and judicially efficient
approach.
Under Mr. Colleli's theory, at least three appeals should be underway, not just one.
Mr. Colleli suggests that to preserve Issues No. 2, 3 and 4, Ms. Colleli should have
"timely" appealed each order underlying those issues. That means, three filing fees; three
Docketing Statements; three Briefs; and three separate reviews and rulings by this Court.
Ms. Colleli, on the other hand, believes that the none of the orders entered by the trial
court ended the controversy between the parties. An adversarial environment existed
throughout the proceedings in the trial court. The parties were in a constant state of
controversy and litigation. Ms. Colleli's approach promotes judicial economy;
Mr. Colleli's approach undermines judicial economy.
Besides judicial economy, keeping as many issues as possible under one appellate
umbrella fosters settlement. The more issues there are to appeal, the greater the risks and
such risks provide more options to make trade offs for settlement purposes.1 For policy
reasons, this Court should adopt a narrow view of what kinds of orders must be appealed
even while other issues continue to be prosecuted in the trial court. This policy is
reflected in a series of divorce cases decided by this Court. See e.g., Olson v Olson,
2001 UT App 218 ("order is not a final divorce decree because it does not resolve the

1

On multiple occasions during the proceedings in the trial court, the parties
engaged in settlement discussions. During those discussions, Issues 2, 3 and 4 were
included as appealable issues and weighed as a means of settlement. That is, they were
additional factors to be considered for settlement purposes.
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controversy between the parties or conclude the divorce litigation") (attached hereto as
Reply Addendum 1); Imani v Imani, 1999 UT App 121 (appeal dismissed because order
did not resolve the controversy between the parties and conclude the litigation) (attached
hereto as Reply Addendum 2); Copier v Copier, 939 P.2d 202 (Utah App 1997) (appeal
dismissed "because [the order] did not resolve the controversy between the parties and
conclude the divorce litigation"). These line of cases discourage interlocutory or multiple
appeals that more properly should be combined in a single appeal.
Further, if some issues are "lost" because of untimely appeals, parties will be filing
appeals on every order just "to be safe." Moreover, timing issues would arise that could
result in a complete loss of an appeal For example, if to be safe, a party files an appeal
on an order during divorce proceedings and sometime thereafter a final order is entered
on all remaining issues, this Court's dismissal of such appeal may occur after the 30-day
period required to file an appeal of the final order. This would cause the order sought to
be reviewed by this Court lost for appeal purposes. In effect, the appeal would be either
too early or too late. That would be an unjust result.
In divorce matters, motions and orders are filed and entered with substantial
frequency. It is difficult enough to manage the flurry of activity in just one case, let alone
manage them for many concurrent cases. The imposition of the policy favored by
Mr. Colleli would create a minefield for attorneys ox pro so parties to navigate. The
approach taken by Ms. Colleli avoids such a minefield and consolidates all issues into a
single, efficient appeal.
-5-

If this Court is inclined to take a strict view of the orders at issue and declare them as
final, Ms. Colleli urges this Court to announce a new exception to the general rule. Such
a rule would permit the efficient consolidation of interim orders entered during a flurry of
proceedings in divorce matters. The result of such an exception would promote judicial
economy for this Court as well as minimize the costs of litigation for the parties, most of
whom are financially struggling with the effects caused by divorce.

Issue No. 4:
Mr. Colleli also sites Larsen v. Larsen, 2003 UT App 408 to support his contention
that denying medical reimbursement for minor children is permissive, not mandatory.
While that is correct, the issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly
rejected a consideration of § 78-45-7.15, U.C.A., as a defense on the basis that Utah Law
did not apply because the Nevada Decree was void of the notice or reporting requirement
imposed by § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A. Therefore, Larsen is inapposite to the instant case.

CONCLUSIONS
Issue No. 1: The sufficiency of the trial court's findings to support its reduction of
attorney fees is inadequate. The issue of transportation was the paramount issue not
resolved until the day of trial, notwithstanding Mr. Colleli's assertion otherwise and
notwithstanding the trial court's dismissive attitude that such issue should have been
resolved much earlier than the day of trial. It was clearly Mr. Colleli's intransigence on
-6-

the issue of transportation that caused the extensive prosecution of the case. Accordingly,
the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous and the amount of attorney fees awarded to
Ms. Colleli are unsupported by the record.
Issues No, 2,3 and 4: The central issue pressed by Mr. Colleli is that these issues
should have been appealed during the proceedings in the trial court. Ms. Colleli contends
that they were not final orders because they did not resolved the controversy between the
parties and did not conclude the litigation. Further, Ms. Colleli urges this Court to carve
out an exception in these kinds of divorce proceeds to promote judicial economy for both
the appellate courts and the parties litigant.

Finally, this Court should also award Ms. Colleli her attorney fees and costs on
appeal.

DATED this 22nd of July 2004.

^/IMU^^

-

Michael A. Jensen (7231) /
Counsel for Appellant, MSTColleli
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Addendum 1
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Westlaw
Not Reported in P.2d
2001 UTApp 218
(Cite as: 2001 WL 755430 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Tracy A. OLSON, Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Franchot L. OLSON, Respondent and Appellant.

Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539-40 (Utah 1979) ("[A]
judgment which disposes of fewer than all of the
causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs complaint is
not a final judgment from which an appeal may be
taken.") (citing J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342, 343 (1965) (per curiam)).
The trial court specifically reserved issues of
custody, visitation, tax exemption and property
distribution for future resolution. The other orders
referenced by Mr. Olson are temporary orders
pending entry of a final decree.

No. 20010390-CA.
July 6, 2001.
Franchot L. Olson, Roy, pro se.
Chad B. McKay, Ogden, for appellee.

Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON, and DAVIS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 Mr. Olson filed a notice of appeal on April 27,
2001, seeking to appeal a March 26, 2001 order on
attorney fees, a March 13, 2001 order granting the
bifurcated divorce, and other earlier orders of the
trial court.

Second, even if the orders were final, Mr. Olson's
notice of appeal is untimely. The attorney fees order
was entered on March 26, 2001, but Mr. Olson did
not file his notice of appeal until April 27, 2001, two
days late. We lack jurisdiction to consider untimely
appeals. See Utah R.App.P. 4(a) (requiring that a
notice of appeal be filed with trial court within thirty
days of date of entry of order sought to be appealed);
Utah RApp.P. 2 (precluding appellate court from
extending thirty day deadline for filing notice of
appeal).
Because the orders Mr. Olson seeks to appeal do not
resolve the issues before the court and, because even
if they were final orders, his notice of appeal was
late, we have no alternative but to dismiss his appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
2001 WL 755430 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 218
END OF DOCUMENT

There are two problems with Mr. Olson's appeal.
First, the orders he seeks to appeal are interim,
nonfmal orders. See A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland
Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991) (stating
under final judgment rule, upon which Utah
R.App.P. 3 is based, parties may not appeal
judgments or orders that are not final). The March 26
order is an interim attorney fee order. The March 13
order is not a final divorce decree because it does not
resolve the controversy between the parties or
conclude the divorce litigation. See Salt Lake City v.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Addendum 2

Page 2

Westlaw.
Not Reported in P.2d
1999 UTApp 121
(Cite as: 1999 WL 33245004 (Utah App.))

UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Pamela E. IMANI, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
Jahangir IMANI, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 990100-CA.
April 15, 1999.
Wayne R.N. Searle, Park City, for appellant.
Robert A. Echard, Ogden, for appellee.

Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and JACKSON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 This matter is before the court on its own motion
for summary disposition. We dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
Utah R.App.P. 3 allows a party to appeal from a
final judgment or order. This rule precludes a party
from taking an appeal from any orders or judgment
that are not final, including orders or judgments
disposing of less than all of the claims presented. A.J.
Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323,
325 (Utah 1991). There are exceptions to this rule.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, the court may certify a judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims as final for
appeal "upon an express determination by the court
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an

express direction for the entry of judgment." Utah
R.Civ.P. 54(b). Failure to properly certify a judgment
on fewer than all of the claims presented leaves the
issues before the trial court and deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Donohue v.
Mouille, 913 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah Ct.App.1996)
(citing First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298, 299
(Utah 1991)). In divorce proceedings, the district
court has continuing jurisdiction over issues such as
custody and child support, and, where an order or
judgment entered by the court does not resolve the
controversy between the parties and conclude the
litigation, such as an initial order in a bifurcated
proceedings, it is not a final appealable order or
judgment absent proper certification. Copier v.
Copier, 939 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct.App.1997).
There has been no final appealable order entered in
the case at hand. Several issues regarding
modification and enforcement of the Colorado
divorce decree and the division of the parties' assets
and debts are still pending. The order sought to be
appealed resolves only one issue between the parties,
and does not conclude the litigation. Thus, absent
proper certification, it is not a final appealable order.
The order has not been properly certified by the trial
court pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). Rule 54(b)
clearly requires that the trial court expressly
determine that there is no just reason for delay of the
appeal. See Bennion v. Penzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137,
139 (Utah 1992); Donohue, 913 P.2d at 777-78 n. 1.
Moreover, the trial court must explain its reasons for
certification, including an explanation regarding the
lack of factual overlap between the certified and
remaining claims. Bennion, 826 P.2d at 139. The
"certification" offered by appellant makes no such
express determination or explanation.
In the absence of a determination by the trial court
that there is no just reason for delay and an
explanation of the reasons for certification, this court
is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and we
have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal. This

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of a new,
timely notice of appeal after the trial court enters a
final order disposing of all the issues raised in the
parties' pleadings and motions.
1999 WL 33245004 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 121
END OF DOCUMENT
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